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STATEMENT OF ISSUE ON APPEAL 
The following is a statement of the issue addressed on plaintiffs5 appeal of the Order 
of Dismissal entered in favor of defendants Dr. Daniel D. Christensen ("Dr. Christensen"); 
Wyeth-Ayerst Research, a division of Wyeth Laboratories Inc. ("Wyeth"); and University 
of Utah Medical Center and the State of Utah ("UUMC"). 
1. Did Judge Hanson correctly rule, based on the allegations in the Complaint, 
that the defendants owed no legal duty to the plaintiffs, as members of the general public, 
to protect them from the possibility that Richard Dunn might operate his own automobile 
in such a way as to cause or contribute to an automobile accident? 
The proper standard of review for the issue is correctness. Barnard v. Utah State 
Bar, 857 P.2d 917, 919 (Utah 1993). This standard of review was properly applied by 
the Court of Appeals because whether the defendants are entitled to relief on the facts pled 
by plaintiffs is a question of law. See Golding v. Ashley Cent. Irr. Co.. 793 P.2d 897, 898 
(Utah 1990). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Plaintiffs in their Petition have again gone far beyond the Record in this case in 
elaborating and supplementing the allegations and matters which were actually before the 
trial court, and Court of Appeals. In an effort to provide a more accurate view of the case, 
defendants submit the following statement: 
A. Nature of The Case and Course of Proceedings Below. 
This action arises out of a two-car collision which occurred in Logan Canyon on 
August 12, 1996. Plaintiffs Reed Thornock and Hanna Thornock were riding in one car 
with decedent, Debra Thornock, when it collided with a second car driven by Richard 
Dunn. Debra Thornock was killed in the accident and Hanna Thornock was injured. R. 
at 3. 
After settling their claims against Richard Dunn, plaintiffs commenced a medical 
malpractice action against Mr. Dunn's health care providers, Dr. Christensen, Wyeth and 
UUMC. R. at 1. Plaintiffs filed a notice of intent to commence a medical malpractice 
action, pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-14-8 on July 11, 1997. 
Plaintiffs alleged in their Complaint that Dr. Christensen had been treating Mr. 
Dunn for depression over a period of time prior to plaintiffs' automobile accident. R. at 
2-3. As part of this treatment, Dr. Christensen enrolled Mr. Dunn in a voluntary l 
investigational study for Venlafaxine-ER (extended release) and Venlafaxine-Oros. 
Venlafaxine is an anti-depression drug manufactured by Wyeth.2 R. at 2. 
^ The Patient Information and Consent Form plaintiffs attached to their Brief to the 
Court of Appeals plainly demonstrate that Mr. Dunn was informed of the risks and 
benefits of the study and the fact that he was free to withdraw at any time. In fact, he was 
actually cautioned in writing "not to drive" until his tolerance to the drug was determined. 
See page 3 of Ex. 4 to Pltfs5 Brf. 
y
 It is significant to note that Venlafaxine, in an immediate release formulation, was 
approved by the FDA for treatment of depression on December 28, 1993 and has been on 
the market in the United States since early 1994. The CCER" or extended release (once-a-
day) formulation which was involved in the subject study was approved by the FDA on 
Plaintiffs claimed that while enrolled in the study, Mr. Dunn demonstrated 
deepening depression, increased aggression, was having trouble sleeping, and refused to do 
volunteer work. R. at 43. They also alleged that, more than year and a half earlier, Mr. 
Dunn had been involved in an auto accident and that all of this information was known to 
Dr. Christensen. R. at 42-43. They claimed that, based on this information, Mr. Dunn 
should not have been in the clinical study and that Dr. Christensen should have put Mr. 
Dunn on other medication or involuntarily hospitalized him for depression, regardless of 
the wishes of Mr. Dunn or his wife. Plaintiffs alleged that Dr. Christensen discussed the 
possibility of hospitalizing Mr. Dunn, but Mrs. Dunn wanted to try to keep him out of 
the hospital. R. at 43. In accordance with the wishes of the patient and his wife, Dr. 
Christensen did not admit Mr. Dunn to the hospital. 
Three days later, while driving home from a family outing to Bear Lake, Mr. Dunn 
was involved in the crossover accident in Logan Canyon, in which Debra Thornock was 
killed and Hanna Thornock injured. Although plaintiffs alleged on page 4 of their Brief to 
the Court of Appeals that the accident was caused by Mr. Dunn becoming "obsessed with 
a 'power5 switch in the vehicle," there is no such allegation or evidence in the Record.3 
October 20, 1997 and has been on die market in the United States since November, 
1997. See direction circular ("package inserts53) attached to Defendant's Brief to the Court 
of Appeals as Appellees5 Addendum "B55. 
^ Rather than being an accident involving a deranged mental patient, this was actually 
a garden variety automobile accident caused by Mr. Dunn's momentary inattention when 
he took his eyes off the road to engage a power button, on a steep curving canyon road. 
See Accident Report and Statement of Richard Dunn, attached to Appellees5 Brief to the 
Plaintiffs filed their Complaint in this action on February 4, 1998. R. at 1. The 
only causes of action in the Complaint were negligence claims against the three defendants 
for their care and treatment of Mr. Dunn. Id 
On March 5, 1998, defendant Dr. Christensen filed a Motion to Dismiss, pursuant 
to Rule 12(b)(6), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. R. at 27. The basis of Dr. 
Christensen's Motion was that, based on the allegations of the Complaint, there was no 
physician-patient relationship between him and the plaintiffs, nor was there any other 
special relationship upon which a legal duty could be imposed on Dr. Christensen to 
protect plaintiffs from any negligent driving by his patient, Mr. Dunn. R. at 16-26. On 
March 9, 1998 and March 26, 1998, defendants UUMC and Wyeth, respectively, filed 
their own Motions to Dismiss, joining in the supporting Memorandum filed by Dr. 
Christensen. R. at 30 and 36. 
On July 17, 1998, District Court Judge Timothy Hanson heard counsel's argument 
on defendants5 motions to dismiss. Following the argument, Judge Hanson granted 
defendants3 motions and subsequently, on August 3, 1998, entered his Order of Dismissal. 
R. at 107. Judge Hanson's Order included the following express language: 
The Court believes it would be impractical and inconsistent 
with the important policy considerations recognized in the 
Utah Court's prior decisions to expand legal duties in this case 
beyond those previously established. Thus a duty can be 
imposed on Dr. Christensen and the other Defendants only if 
they reasonably should have known that Mr. Dunn posed a 
Court of Appeals as Addendum CCC". 
specific danger of harm to the Plaintiffs as identifiable 
individuals or members of a distinct group. Plaintiffs3 counsel 
concedes that Dr. Christensen and the other Defendants could 
not have reasonably identified Plaintiffs as individuals or 
members of a "distinct, identifiable group35 other than as 
members of the motoring public. The Court concludes that 
the motoring public is not sufficiently distinguishable from the 
general public to give rise to any legal duty 
R. at 108-109. Judge Hanson also identified as a further basis for his ruling Utah Code 
Ann. § 78-14a-102. IdL at 109 (A copy of the Order of Dismissal is attached as 
Addendum 5 to Plaintiffs5 Brief.) 
Plaintiffs filed a Notice of Appeal from the Order of Dismissal on August 13, 1998. 
R. at 113. On February 3, 2000, the Court of Appeals issued its Memorandum Decision, 
rejecting plaintiff/appellant's arguments and affirming the district court's dismissal. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
PLAINTIFF/PETITIONER FAILS TO IDENTIFY ANY 
SPECIAL AND IMPORTANT REASONS FOR 
GRANTING REVIEW. 
Review by writ of certiorari is not liberally granted. It is a matter of judicial 
discretion and "granted only for special and important reasons.55 Rule 46, Utah R. App. 
P. The Rules of Appellate Procedure specifically list the "character of reasons55, or criteria, 
that will be considered. These criteria include: 
Rule 46. Considerations governing review of certiorari. 
(1) When a panel of the Court of Appeals has rendered a 
decision in conflict with a decision of another panel of the 
Court of Appeals on the same issue of law; 
(2) When a panel of the Court of Appeals has decided a 
question of state or federal law in a way that is in conflict with 
a decision of the Supreme Court; 
(3) When a panel of the Court of Appeals has rendered a 
decision that has so far departed from the accepted and usual 
course of judicial proceedings or has so far sanctioned such a 
departure by a lower court as to call for an exercise of the 
Supreme Court's power of supervision; or 
(4) When the Court of Appeals has decided an important 
question of municipal, state or federal law which has not been, 
but should be, setded by the Supreme Court. 
Plaintiff has failed in his Petition to identify any of the factors recognized by the 
Supreme Court for justifying grant of a writ. It is, in fact, apparent that the Court of 
Appeals closely followed the controlling cases of Rollins v. Petersen, 813 P.2d 1156, 
(Utah 1991); Wilson v. Valley Mental Health. 969 P.2d 416, 419 (Utah 1998); Beach v. 
University of Utah. 726 P.2d 413 (Utah 1986); and Higgins v. Salt Lake County. 855 
P.2d231, 235 (Utah 1993): 
In the instance case, as in Rollins, Appellant's wife and daughter were not 
victims who reasonably could have been identified by Appellees. Dunn did 
not set himself apart in terms of dangerousness to them any more than he 
did to other users of public roads. We conclude that this case is 
indistinguishable from Rollins and hold that Appellees had no duty to 
protect Appellant's wife and daughter from Dunn. 
We decline Appellant's invitation to distinguish this case from Wilson, 
Higgins, or Rollins based upon the distinction that Appellees were also 
engaged in an investigational drug study rather than solely in the standard 
diagnosis, treatment, and cure of an illness. We conclude this factual 
distinction is legally irrelevant. Accordingly, we hold that Appellees had no 
duty to the Thornocks, and affirm the trial court's dismissal of Thornock's 
complaint. 
See Court of Appeals Opinion, p. 3 (attached as Exhibit "A" to Petition for Writ of 
Certiorari). 
POINT II 
THE COURT OF APPEAL'S DECISION IS IN 
CONFORMITY WITH WELL-ESTABLISHED UTAH 
LAW 
Plaintiff argues that the Court of Appeals decision "conferred a statutory limitation 
of liability on undeserving individuals and corporations" which "creates a precedent under 
which future scientific explorers might also find shelter when their experiments go awry 
and injure members of the community." Plaintiffs Petition, p. 8. In fact, the Court of 
Appeals decision, like the district court's decision, is plainly based on well-established Utah 
common law. The Court quite properly refused to carve out the illogical exception 
propounded by the plaintiff/petitioner. While the statute regarding a therapist's duty to 
warn does constitute an additional basis for affirming dismissal, it was not the expressed 
primary basis for the Court of Appeals' decision. The Court of Appeals decision is firmly 
rooted in fundamental Utah tort law. 
Plaintiff in this case sought to have the district court impose a duty on defendants 
to protect or insure members of the general public from the conduct of persons who 
voluntarily seek psychiatric therapy and enroll in a voluntary clinical drug trial for a 
depression medication. Specifically he sought to impose on Dr. Christensen a duty to 
either confine or involuntarily medicate all patients who appear unstable and emotionally 
unpredictable. Such a duty has clearly been rejected under both common and statutory 
law of the State of Utah.4 
A. COMMON LAW 
The Court of Appeals expressly and appropriately based its decision in this case on 
several controlling Utah Supreme Court cases. This Court has plainly refused to recognize 
a duty to control the conduct of another person so as to prevent that person from harming 
himself or others, unless a special relationship exists not only with the actor, but also with 
an identifiable third person or group distinguishable from the general public. This rule is 
not limited only to cctherapists5' or cases involving mental health patients. It is rather a 
basic principle of tort law. See Wilson v. Valley Mental Health, 969 P.2d 416, 419 (Utah 
* Although plaintiff now strenuously attempts to deny that Dr. Christensen's 
relationship with Mr. Dunn was a physician - patient relationship, the facts, even as alleged 
are quite clear. Mr. Dunn had been under Dr. Christensen's psychiatric care for some time 
prior to offering Mr. Dunn the opportunity to receive the new treatment under the clinical 
trials. Plaintiffs claims, moreover, necessarily arise out of the health care provider/patient 
relationship because he claims that defendant Christensen should have forcibly medicated 
or involuntarily hospitalized Mr. Dunn. 
1998); Beach v. University of Utah. 726 P.2d 413 (Utah 1986); Ferree v. State of Utah. 
784 P.2d 149, 151 (Utah 1989). 
In Higgins, a woman with mental illness who had a long history of violent 
behavior, stabbed and Idlled a 10-year-old girl. The woman had on several occasions been 
voluntarily and involuntarily hospitalized for treatment of her mental condition. As in this 
case, the plaintiffs alleged that health care providers, as well as the county, were negligent 
in their diagnosis, supervision, treatment of and failure to commit the patient. 
The plaintiffs in Higgins asserted two categories of theories that the defendants 
owed them a duty related to defendants5 care of their mentally ill patient: (1) "that 
defendants owed a general duty to any third party foreseeably at risk from their negligence 
in treating and supervising Trujillo [the patient];5' and (2) "that a special relationship 
existed between defendants and Trujillo that gave rise to a duty by defendants to the 
Higginses.55 Higgins at 235. Citing judicial precedent and public policy considerations, 
the Court found no difficulty in rejecting the general duty argument. 
We reject the first of these grounds as being contrary to 
established precedents in this and other states. As we recently 
explained, "Because people are inherently less controllable than 
physical things, the common law has imposed no duty to 
control the conduct of others except in certain circumstances, 
as where a special relationship exists.".... 
Second, in part because the proposed duty is 
incompatible with the real world environment in which 
patients and health-care professionals coexist, this ill-defined, 
amorphous duty would invite jury hindsight bias. The 
resulting duty to the general public would "closely 
approximate a strict liability standard of care, and therapists 
would be potentially liable for all harm inflicted by persons 
presently or formerly under psychiatric treatment." 
Higgins at 235-36 (citations omitted). Finding "no persuasive reasons for departing from 
our precedents and sacrificing these important policy considerations," the Court refused to 
adopt a general duty owed by therapists to third parties based upon foreseeability 
Higgins at 236. 
The Court noted that a third party duty under Utah common law could only be 
imposed: (1) where a patient was in custody or control of another; (2) the custodian 
knew or should have known that the patient was likely to cause bodily harm; and (3) to 
persons who were "reasonably identifiable by the custodian either individually or as 
members of a distinct group.53 Higgins at 238. The Court held that it is reasonable to 
impose a duty only when "the theoretical danger of the one in custody [or treatment] 
became sufficiently crystallized that it took on a specific object and means." Higgins at 
238. (Emphasis added.) 
Applying the analysis to the specific role of therapists, the Court summarized its 
statement of the law. 
Limiting the duty to third parties who are "reasonably 
identifiable by the [therapist] either individually or as [a] 
member of a distinct group," permits us, in most instances, to 
uphold the public policies of protecting the traditional 
confidentiality of the provider/patient relationship, which is 
important both for privacy reasons and for the efficacy of the 
therapeutic relationship. At the same time, it ensures the 
minimum use of involuntary commitment consistent with 
protecting identifiable potential victims. 
Higgins at 239 (citations omitted, emphasis added). 
In another closely analogous case, Rollins v. Petersen, 813 P.2d 1156, (Utah 
1991), a man was killed in an automobile accident in which his vehicle collided with a 
stolen car driven by a patient who escaped from the State Hospital. His heirs alleged the 
hospital was negligent in allowing him to escape and in not recapturing him. In 
evaluating whether the hospital owed a duty to the deceased to keep the patient under 
stricter control to prevent injuries to third parties, the Court again relied on the 
"identifiable victim" doctrine. 
The question becomes whether Schopf was reasonably 
identifiable by the hospital either individually or as a member 
of a distinct group. Viewing the facts in the light most 
favorable to plaintiffs, we find that he was not. The record is 
devoid of any evidence to indicate that, as to the hospital, 
Schopf was in any way distinguishable, either himself or as a 
member of any distinct group that may be injurable. Rather, 
Schopf was simply a member of the public, no more 
distinguishable to the hospital than to any other person. As to 
the hospital, Petersen had not set himself apart in terms of 
dangerousness to Schopf personally or to any distinct group of 
which Schopf was a member. Therefore, the hospital owed no 
duty to Schopf. 
Rollins at 1162. 
In October, 1998, the Utah Supreme Court reinforced its rulings in Higgins and 
Rollins. The Court noted, cc[W]e generally adhere to the basic tort principle that one has 
no duty to control the conduct of others." Wilson, 969 P.2d at 419. The Court then 
went on to quote approvingly from both Higgins and Rollins. In sum, "we will find a 
special relationship and consequent duty when a defendant knew of the likely danger to an 
individual or distinct group of individuals or when a defendant should have known of such 
a danger.53 (Emphasis added.) Id 
Utah courts have been extremely reluctant to impose third-party duties based on 
the special relationship exceptions absent a clearly defined special relationship which fits 
squarely into the exceptions.5 Other courts have similarly rejected these third-party 
duties.6 
57
 Rollins at 237 (ccloath to recognize a duty33); Ferree v. State, at 784 P.2d 149, 151 
(Utah 1989) ("to adopt plaintiffs3 theories would impose too broad a duty of care33); 
Higgins at 235 (rejecting duty to general public based on foreseeability of injury); Beach 
v. University of Utah, 726 P.2d 413 (Utah 1986) (no special relationship between 
university and student injured on university sponsored field trip); Drysdale on Behalf of 
Strong v. Rogers, 869 P.2d 1 (Utah App. 1994) (no special relationship between parents 
of 19-year-old intoxicated driver and victim of accident); Cannon v. University of Utah, 
866 P.2d 586 (Utah App. 1993) (no special relationship between university and injured 
pedestrians going to university sponsored basketball game). 
^ Praesel v. Tohnson, M.D., 967 S.W2d 391 (Texas 1991) (treating physicians owed 
no duty to third parties to warn epileptic patient not to drive); Calwell v. Hassan, 925 
P2d 422 (Kan. 1996) (no third-party duty where medication failed to control sleep 
disorder and patient fell asleep while driving) Burchvield v. U.S., 750 E Supp. 1312, 
1319 (S.D. Miss. 1990) (no duty to control where there was no right nor ability to 
control a voluntary patient); Boynton v. Burglass, 590 So.2d 446, 449 (Fla. App. 1991) 
(declining to recognize third-party duty because psychiatrist-patient relationship lacked 
sufficient elements of control to create the duty); Anthony v. U.S., 616 E Supp. 156, 158 
(S.D. Iowa 1985) (no third-party duty under Iowa law where a defendant simply failed to 
act affirmatively to control the conduct of a voluntarily admitted mental patient). 
B. STATUTORY LAW 
The Utah Legislature has also, as a matter of public policy adopted and extended 
the "identifiable victim" approach by pronouncing that a psychiatrist has no duty to warn 
of possible injury or to take other precautions except where an actual threat exists against 
identifiable victims. 
A therapist7 has no duty to warn or take precautions to 
provide protection from any violent behavior of his client or 
patient, except when that client or patient communicated to 
the therapist an actual threat of physical violence against a 
clearly identified or reasonably identifiable victim. . . . 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-14a-102(l) (1994). The statute clearly anticipates a duty only 
where the psychiatrist actually knows of a likely injury to a specific person rather than 
where the therapist might anticipate an unknown theoretical injury to unknown 
individuals. 
As noted in Wilson, the statute imposes a narrower duty on the therapist or 
psychiatrist than the Utah case law, but under either the case law or the statute there can 
be no duty under the allegations of this case. 969 E2d at 420. 
7J
 The statutory definition of therapist includes psychiatrists licensed to practice 
medicine. Utah Code Ann. § 78-14a-101(l) (See Addendum "A35 to Appellee's Brief to 
the Court of Appeals.). 
C. THORNOCKS WERE NOT REASONABLY IDENTIFIABLE 
INDIVIDUALS OR MEMBERS OF A DISTINCT GROUP LIKELY TO 
BE HARMED BY MR. DUNN. 
Plaintiff has never alleged that he and his family were reasonably identifiable to the 
defendants, nor that they were members of a distinct group of individuals. In fact, 
plaintiffs counsel conceded to the trial court that they were not members of any 
identifiable group, other than the large undifferentiated group of "the motoring public." 
See Order of Dismissal, R. at 108-109. That large, generalized group fails to meet the 
requirements under Wilson, Higgins, and Rollins to impose a duty on the defendants. 
Plaintiff now attempts to twist the requirements of Wilson, Rollins, and Higgins by 
arguing that Mr. Dunn, who is not a party to this case, "was reasonably identifiable as a 
threat," and that this fact justifies imposing a duty on defendants. Plaintiffs argument is 
frivolous and ignores the fact that in all three of the Utah cases where the court declined 
to find a duty, the patient was also reasonably identifiable as a potential threat. The 
relevant question is not whether the patient is identifiable as a potential threat to the 
public, but rather whether the Thornocks were reasonably identifiable to defendants as 
individuals or members of a distinct group prior to the accident. Plaintiff has admitted 
that they were not. The Court of Appeals, accordingly, correctly concluded there was no 
duty to owed to plaintiffs. 
POINT III 
ADDITIONAL POLICY CONSIDERATIONS WEIGH 
HEAVILY AGAINST IMPOSING THE DUTY 
PROPOSED BY PLAINTIFFS. 
Despite the safeguards already in place in this country plaintiff is essentially seeking 
to impose a form of strict liability on medical researchers for any injuries that occur to 
members of the general public as a result of tortious conduct by a study participant. Such 
a duty is impractical, unsupported by the law and against public policy 
Plaintiff now cites in his Petition to a couple of journal articles to support his 
argument that physicians involved in clinical research have a conflict of interest and don't 
care about curing their patients. This broad, generalized accusation not only plainly 
maligns a vast number of conscientious and caring clinical practitioners interested in 
providing their patients with the newest (and perhaps best) opportunities for cures, but it 
also is entirely irrelevant to the issue at hand. Allegations of conflict of interest and failure 
to provide appropriate medical treatment might be relevant in a first party medical 
negligence claim, but have no relevance to the issue of whether a duty exists to protect 
third parties from harm. The Court of Appeals properly rejected plaintiffs alarmist 
"policy" arguments as irrelevant to the legal issue on appeal. 
CONCLUSION 
Petitioner would have this Court carve out an exception to Utah's well-established 
common law and clear legislative pronouncements, to impose an impractical and chilling 
duty on health care providers and those who are seeking to improve and advance medical 
treatment under already stringent governmental regulations. In a well-reasoned opinion, 
wholly consistent with established precedents, the Court of Appeals quite appropriately 
rejected plaintiffs argument. The Petition for Writ of Certiorari should be denied. 
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